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ABSTRACT: According to accessibilism, there is an accessibility condition on 
justification. More specifically, accessibilism claims that facts about justification are a 
priori accessible—where a priori is used in the traditional sense that a condition is a 
priori just in case it doesn’t depend on any of the sense modalities. The most prominent 
argument for accessibilism draws on BonJour and Lehrer's unfamiliar faculty scenarios. 
Recently, however, several objections have been raised against it. In this article, I defend 
the argument against three prominent objections from the recent literature.  
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1. Accessibilism 
Epistemic internalists claim that facts about justification in some special sense 
depend upon one's internal states. Traditionally, there are two different ways in 
which this idea has been developed. On the one hand, some internalists support 
mentalism; i.e., the view that facts about justification supervene upon one's non-
factive mental states.1 On the other hand, others support accessibilism or access 
internalism; i.e., the view that facts about justification always are a priori accessible 
(henceforth, I'll just use the term 'accessible')—where a priori is used in the 
traditional sense that a condition is a priori just in case it doesn’t depend on any of 
                                                        
1 Proponents of mentalism include John Pollock & Joseph Cruz, Contemporary Theories of 
Knowledge, (Rowman & Littlefield, 1999); Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, "Internalism 
Defended," American Philosophical Quarterly 38, 1 (2001): 95-119; Ralph Wedgwood, 
"Internalism Explained," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65, 2 (2002): 349-369; 
Declan Smithies, "Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency," Australian Journal of Philosophy, 90, 
4 (2012): 723-741; Kevin McCain, Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification (Routledge, 2016); 
and Jonathan Egeland, "The Demon That Makes Us Go Mental: Mentalism Defended," 
Philosophical Studies 176, 12 (2019), 1-19. 
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the sense modalities.2,3 This paper focuses on the latter of the two internalisms, 
namely accessibilism. 
Accessibilism is often thought to receive support from intuitions about cases 
involving unfamiliar faculties, like clairvoyance. The general idea is that beliefs 
produced by unfamiliar faculties aren't justified, and that the best explanation for 
why that is so is that it must be possible for one to tell—at least in principle—what 
one's beliefs rationally have going for them, if they are justified. Recently, 
however, this kind of argument has come under heavy fire by proponents of 
epistemic externalism; i.e., the view that internalism is false. This paper will defend 
the argument above by responding to three different objections developed in the 
literature: one of which criticizes the internalist intuitions, and two that criticize 
the abductive inference that the argument employs. Doing this, the purpose of the 
paper is to demonstrate that the argument withstands recent externalist objections, 
and, consequently, that accessibilism remains as plausible as ever.  
This is how the paper is structured. In section 2, I identify and answer core 
questions about what commitments the accessibilist should make, while also 
pointing to prominent, but implausible, versions of accessibilism in the literature. 
In section 3, I present a couple of well-known scenarios—Laurence Bonjour's 
clairvoyance case and Keith Lehrer's Truetemp case—and argue that the intuitions 
they elicit strongly support the accessibilist view endorsed in the previous section. 
In sections 4 to 6, I defend this argument against three objections recently 
developed in the literature. The first objection bites the bullet and says that the 
beliefs of the subjects in BonJour and Lehrer's scenarios actually are justified; the 
second says that there are alternative, externalist explanations of the intuitions 
elicited by the aforementioned scenarios that are more plausible than the one 
offered by the accessibilist; and the third is Michael Bergmann's dilemma, which is 
                                                        
2 Thus, the modes of a priori accessibility include not only reflection and reasoning, but also 
introspection and other cognitive mechanisms with an experiential aspect. For more on the 
distinction between narrow and broad notions of the a priori, see Albert Casullo, A Priori 
Justification (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
3 Proponents of accessibilism or access internalism include Laurence BonJour, The Structure of 
Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); Roderick Chisholm, 
Theory of Knowledge (Prentice-Hall Inc., 1989); Richard Fumerton, Metaepistemology and 
Skepticism (Rowman and Littlefield, 1995); Robert Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary 
Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (New York: Routledge, 1998); Matthias Steup, "A 
Defense of Internalism,” in The Theory of Knowledge, Classical and Contemporary Readings, ed. 
Louis Pojman (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1999), 373-384; and Declan Smithies, 
"Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification," Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 85, 2 (2012): 273-300. 
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a reductio against accessibilism. Having responded to these objections, I summarize 
and conclude in section 7. 
2. What Kind of Accessibilist Should You Be? 
Before I present and defend the main argument, I want to spend a few pages on 
what commitments the accessibilist should make. This is important, not just 
because many internalists have defended implausible versions of the view, but also 
because many of the objections levelled against it only undermine those 
implausible versions of it. Let's therefore begin by taking a closer look at what 
commitments the accessibilist should make. My discussion will revolve around 
three core questions, the first of which is: 
2.1 What Kind of Justification Is Accessible? 
It is common to draw a distinction between two kinds of justification.4 First, you 
can have justification to believe a certain proposition, regardless of whether or not 
you actually believe it. For example, after listening to a history lecture you can 
have justification to believe that the Viking Leif Erikson was the first European to 
discover North America, but without actually believing it. Second, you can also 
have justifiably held beliefs (or other doxastic attitudes). For example, if you come 
to believe the proposition above in a way that is properly based on that which 
gives you justification to believe it, then your belief is justifiably held. Following 
Roderick Firth,5 we can say that the first kind of justification is justification in the 
propositional sense, whereas the second kind of justification is justification in the 
doxastic sense.6 Given the above characterization of the distinction, it is clear that 
propositional justification is necessary, but not sufficient, for doxastic justification. 
Now, which of these kinds of justification is accessible? Although I don’t 
know of any internalist who thinks that one always has a special sort of access to 
facts about doxastic justification, it’s not hard to see how such a view would go. 
                                                        
4 Some even operate with three kinds of justification. See, e.g., Clayton Littlejohn, Justification 
and the Truth-Connection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 5. 
5 Roderick Firth, "Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to Ethical Concepts?" in Values and Morals, 
eds. Alvin Goldman and Jaegwon Kim (Dordrecht: Kluwer), 215-229. 
6 Other epistemologists use different terminology to draw the same distinction. See, e.g., Alvin 
Goldman, "What Is Justified Belief," in Justification and Knowledge, ed. George Pappas (Boston: 
D. Reidel, 1979), 1-25; Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, "Evidentialism," Philosophical Studies 
48, 1 (1985): 15-34; James Pryor, "There Is Immediate Justification," in Contemporary Debates in 
Epistemology, eds. Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa (Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), 202-
222; and Declan Smithies, The Epistemic Role of Consciousness,(Oxford University Press, 2019). 
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The internalist who advocates this kind of view thinks that facts about which 
beliefs one now justifiably holds somehow are within the subject’s cognitive grasp. 
The problem, however, is that, according to the analysis above, doxastic 
justification is propositional justification plus proper basing,7 and it is highly 
doubtful that one always has access to whether one satisfies the basing 
requirement. In other words, one has a justifiably held belief just in case (i) one has 
justification for holding that belief, and (ii) one holds it by properly basing it on 
that which gives one justification to hold it; but it is implausible that whether one 
satisfies the second condition is something that is accessibleto one. 
In order to illustrate why the basing requirement, which converts 
propositional justification into doxastic justification if satisfied, isn’t accessible, 
consider Jonathan Schaffer’s8 debasing demon. A debasing demon can make the 
beliefs one holds unjustified in the doxastic sense by undetectably changing the 
basis on which they are held, while still having it seem to the victim as if his 
beliefs are held on their proper justificatory basis: “[The debasing demon] throws 
her victims into the belief state on an improper basis, while leaving them with the 
impression as if they had proceeded properly.”9 The debasing demon is conjured by 
acceptance of the following claims: 
1. Knowledge [and doxastic justification] requires the production of belief, 
properly based on the evidence. 
2. Any belief can be produced on an improper basis. 
3. It is always possible, when a belief is produced on an improper basis, for it to 
seem later as if one had produced a belief properly based on the evidence.10 
Moreover, as Schaffer points out, there are strong reasons for accepting each of the 
claims. The first is accepted by almost all contemporary epistemologists; the second 
is motivated by the idea that any belief can be held in an evidentially insensitive 
manner on the basis of, say, wishful thinking, blind guesses, or random hunches; 
and the third is supported by the idea that our awareness of one's past mental 
processes is fallible. Taken together, it follows from these claims that the basing 
                                                        
7 John Turri, "On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification," Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 80, 2 (2010): 312-326, provides counterexamples to the analysis. 
Declan Smithies, "Ideal Rationality and Logical Omniscience," Synthese 192, 9 (2015), 2769-
2793, responds that we simply can define proper basing as whatever turns propositional 
justification into doxastic justification. Thus, “immunity from counterexample may be gained at 
the cost of reduction.” (Ibid., footnote 19.) 
8 Jonathan Schaffer, "The Debasing Demon," Analysis 70, 2 (2010): 228-237. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 232. 
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relation isn't accessible: it is possible that there is a demon that debases one's 
beliefs, but while still having it seem as if they are properly based on one's 
evidence.11,12 Hence, accessibilism should be formulated as a thesis about 
propositional justification, rather than doxastic justification.13 
2.2 What Does Having Access to Facts About Justification More Specifically 
Require? 
Let’s define the justification facts as the facts about which doxastic attitudes one 
now has propositional justification (to a certain degree) to hold. Plausibly, one has 
access to the justification facts only if one has access to (facts about) one’s 
justifiers14; i.e., to whatever confers justification upon the doxastic attitudes one 
now has justification to hold. Indeed, it is (at least in part) in virtue of one’s access 
                                                        
11 According to Patrick Bondy and Adam Carter, "The Basing Relation and the Impossibility of 
the Debasing Demon," American Philosophical Quarterly 55, 3 (forthcoming): 203-216, 
Schaffer's argument fails since the debasing scenario isn't possible. Beginning from the 
assumption that it is possible, they try to establish their conclusion by reductio. They do this by 
showing how the scenario is inconsistent with the most prominent analyses of the basing 
relation in the literature. However, a problem with their objection is that Schaffer's argument 
isn't committed to any of those analyses. Indeed, since all of them are subject to counterexamples 
(as Bondy and Carter rightfully point out), there are good reasons for why he shouldn't be 
committed to any of them. Instead, insofar as we have a good intuitive grasp of the basing 
relation, Schaffer can theorize about it without being committed to any particular analysis of the 
notion.  
12 Another worry about Schaffer's argument is that it doesn't apply to doxastic theories of the 
basing relation, according to which having a meta-belief B2 to the effect that that one has a 
reason r supporting one's belief B1 is sufficient for B1 to be based on r (see, e.g., Adam Leite, 
"Believing One's Reasons Are Good," Synthese 161, 3 (2008): 419-441). However, I do not think 
that this kind of doxastic theory about the basing relation is successful. For example, it appears to 
be possible to have the relevant meta-belief B2, but without the belief B1 satisfying the basing 
requirement. For a counterexample along these lines, see Keith Korcz, "The Epistemic Basing 
Relation", in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Zalta (2015): 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/basing-epistemic/ [Downloaded: 12.01.2019.].  
13 Henceforth, I will therefore only focus on propositional justification (as does the argument that 
is presented in the next section). However, I suspect that it won't always be possible to clearly 
differentiate talk about the various types of justification without additional commentary. 
14 Whether accessibilism should be analyzed in terms of one's access to one's justifiers or in terms 
of one's access to true propositions/facts about one's justifiers (e.g., facts to the effect that one 
now is/isn't in possession of a certain justifier J) is an issue that I won't go further into here. So 
even though many of the formulations in this article appear to favor the first alternative, this is 
simply for the sake of convenience and shouldn't be seen as committal with respect to the issue 
at hand.  
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to one’s justifiers that the justification facts are accessible. This has led many 
epistemologists, internalists and externalists alike, to formulate accessibilism (or 
internalism more generally) as a thesis about one’s access to one’s justifiers. Here 
are a few examples: 
The basic thrust of internalism in epistemology, therefore, is that the properties 
that confer warrant upon a belief are properties to which the believer has some 
special sort of epistemic access.15 
What we shall call “accessibilism” holds that the epistemic justification of a 
person’s belief is determined by things to which the person has some special sort 
of access.16 
What all forms of internalism have in common is that they require, for a belief’s 
justification, that the person holding the belief be aware (or at least potentially 
aware) of something contributing to its justification. . . I shall take the following 
to be the canonical formulation of this requirement: The Awareness 
Requirement: S’s belief B is justified only if (i) there is something, X, that 
contributes to the justification of B—e.g., evidence for B or a truth-indicator for B 
or the satisfaction of some necessary condition of B’s justification—and (ii) S is 
aware (or potentially aware) of X.17 
However, a problem with these formulations is that having access to one’s 
justifiers is only a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for having access to the 
justification facts. They therefore fail to capture the sort of accessibility that 
internalism requires. By way of illustration, consider someone—let’s call him 
Johnny—who has justification for believing that Reykjavik is the capital of Iceland. 
The reason Johnny has justification for believing that Reykjavik is the capital of 
Iceland is that he has a memory belief to the effect that a trustworthy geography 
teacher told him so (this is his justifier). Moreover, let’s say that Johnny has access 
to his memory belief, but not to the fact that it supports believing the proposition 
above. From Johnny’s first person perspective, his memory belief that a 
trustworthy geography teacher told him that Reykjavik is the capital of Iceland has 
no bearing whatsoever on the belief that Reykjavik is the capital of Iceland. Now, 
it is clear that Johnny’s access to his memory belief isn’t sufficient for the kind of 
accessibility that internalism demands; i.e., access to the justification facts.18 The 
reason is simply that, from his subjective perspective, there's nothing supporting 
                                                        
15 Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 6. 
16 Conee & Feldman, Internalism Defended, 2. 
17 Michael Bergmann, Justification without Awareness (Oxford University Press, 2006), 9. 
18 Consequently, according to internalism, Johnny’s doesn’t have justification for believing that 
Reykjavik is the capital of Iceland. 
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the proposition that Reykjavik is the capital of Iceland (not even his memory belief 
does). Indeed, the weaker access requirement satisfied by Johnny and suggested in 
the formulations above is captured by William Alston’s externalist position—
which he calls internalist externalism—according to which one’s justifiers are 
accessible, but the facts in virtue of which they confer justification (which Alston 
takes to be facts about reliability, understood in terms of objective probability) are 
not.19 
In order to remedy this problem, we should instead say that the justification 
facts are accessible if and only if both one’s justifiers and the facts about which 
doxastic attitudes they support (and the degree to which they support them) are 
accessible. This will rule out that someone like Johnny can have justification for 
holding a certain belief, but without being in a position to tell what that belief 
rationally has going for it. Thus, accessibilism can be formulated as the thesis that 
the justification facts are accessible, or, alternatively, as the thesis that one’s 
justifiers and the facts about justificatory support (i.e., which doxastic attitudes 
one’s justifiers support, and to what degree) are accessible.  
2.3 How Are the Justification Facts Accessible? 
Lastly, let's consider what kind of access we have to the justification facts. 
Generally speaking, there are two ways in which the accessibility in question has 
been understood. First, some internalists argue that the justification facts, in some 
special sense, are psychologically accessible. For example, according to BonJour20, 
one has justification to believe that p only if one has a (justified) higher-order 
belief to the effect that one has justification to believe that p. As he says in his 
argument against foundationalism, a belief B is justified only if there is an 
argument of the following form: 
(1) B has feature Φ. 
(2) Beliefs having feature Φ are highly likely to be true. 
(3) Therefore, B is highly likely to be true. 
[And] in order for B to be justified for a particular person A (at a particular time), 
it is necessary, not merely that a justification along the above lines exist in the 
abstract, but also that A himself be in cognitive possession of that justification, 
that is, that he believe the appropriate premises of forms (1) and (2) and that these 
                                                        
19 William Alston, Epistemic Justification (Cornell University Press, 1989). Kathrin Glüer and 
Åsa Wikforss, "Reasons for Belief and Normativity," in Oxford Handbook on Reasons and 
Normativity, ed. Daniel Star (Oxford University Press, 2018), also endorse this view.  
20 BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. 
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beliefs be justified for him.21  
Similarly, according to Roderick Chisholm,22 one has justification to believe 
that p only if one is able to know, in virtue of reflection alone, that one has 
justification to believe that p. This is how he puts the point.  
The internalist assumes that, merely by reflecting upon his own conscious state, 
he can formulate a set of epistemic principles that will enable him to find out, 
with respect to any possible belief he has, whether he is justified in having that 
belief.23 
However, proponents of the psychological accessibility of justification face a 
couple of problems. First, they face a regress problem insofar as one has 
justification for a first-order belief only if one has (the ability to form) a second-
order belief to the effect that one has justification for one's first-order belief, and 
one has justification for this second-order belief only if one has (the ability to 
form) a third-order belief to the effect that one has justification for one's second 
order belief, and so on ad infinitum. But since no human is able to have such and 
infinite stock of higher-order beliefs of ever-increasing complexity, it follows that 
no human has justification for their first-order beliefs, and this is clearly absurd.24 
Second, they also face an over-intellectualization problem insofar as there 
are unreflective creatures (e.g., children, non-human animals, or the mentally 
disabled) who seem to have justification to hold certain beliefs, even though they 
don't have the reflective or conceptual abilities to form higher-order beliefs about 
which lower-order beliefs they have justification to hold. Thus, the view that the 
justification facts are psychologically accessible again has counterintuitive 
consequences.25 
For these reasons, I think we should explore the other way in which the 
notion of "access" has been understood.26 On this view, the accessibility in question 
                                                        
21 Ibid., 31. 
22 Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge. 
23 Ibid., 76. 
24 Alston, Epistemic Justification, ch.8; Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Skepticism, ch. 3. 
Bergmann, Justification without Awareness, ch. 1; and Hilary Kornblith, On Reflection (Oxford 
University Press, 2012), ch.1, to mention just a few, argue that internalism faces regress 
problems. 
25 The over-intellectualization problem is raised by Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986); Alston, Epistemic Justification; and Richard 
Feldman, "Respecting the Evidence," Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 95-119. 
26 There are, of course, other internalists who define the relevant kind of accessibility in 
psychological terms, but who do so in a much weaker sense that avoids the problems above (see, 
e.g., Fumerton, "Respecting the Evidence"). However, a problem with views of this kind is that 
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is understood in epistemic terms, but in a way that doesn't presuppose anything 
about one's psychological abilities or states. For example, according to Declan 
Smithies,27 one has justification to believe that p only if one has justification to 
believe that one has justification to believe that p. This idea is captured by the 
following iteration principle: 
The JJ Principle: Jp → JJp.28 
Similarly, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio29 claims that internalism (which she opposes) 
should be understood as the view that a necessary condition for having (first-order) 
justification to hold a certain doxastic attitude is that one has higher-order 
justification to believe that one does. 
A natural way of putting more meat on these bones is as follows. Whenever 
you have (first-order) justification to hold a certain doxastic attitude—let's just say 
a belief—toward proposition p, you also have (higher-order) justification to believe 
that you do. This higher-order justification is provided by one's faculty of 
introspection and one's faculty of reflection. You thus have higher-order 
introspective and reflective justification to believe that you have the lower-order 
justification that you in fact do have. By way of example, let's say that you have a 
piece of evidence (e.g., a certain visual experience) e that gives you justification to 
believe that there is a chessboard in front of you. Now, according to the proposal at 
hand, a necessary condition for having any evidence is that you have introspective 
justification to believe that you do have that evidence: e → Je. Moreover, another 
necessary condition on e is that you have reflective justification to believe that it 
supports the proposition(s) p it in fact does support: esupp → Jesupp. Also, having 
introspective justification to believe that you have evidence e and reflective 
justification to believe that e supports p is sufficient for having (higher-order) 
                                                                                                                      
they aren't really supported by the considerations that motivate accessibilism in first place. For a 
larger discussion of this issue, see Bergmann, Justification without Awareness, ch. 2. 
27 Smithies, "Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification". 
28 Smithies calls it The Positive Self-Intimation Thesis. Moreover, he actually supports principles 
that are a lot stronger than this. More specifically, he thinks propositional justification has the 
following structure:  
"The Accessibility Thesis: 
Positive: one has justification to believe that piff one has justification to believe 
that one has justification to believe that p (Jp ↔ JJp). 
Negative: one lacks justification to believe that piff one has justification to believe 
that one lacks justification to believe that p (Jp ↔ JJp)." (Smithies, "Moore's 
Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification", 273.) 
29 Maria Lasonen-Aarnio, "Higher-Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat," Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 88, 2 (2014): 314-345. 
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justification to believe that you have (first-order) justification to believe that p: (Je 
∧ Jesupp) → JJp. Thus, if you have (first-order) justification to believe that there is a 
chessboard in front of you, then you have (higher-order) introspective and 
reflective justification to believe that you do.30, 31 
Now, notice how this kind of view doesn't tell us anything about our 
psychology. For example, in order to have justification to believe a certain 
proposition, it doesn't require that we actually believe (or have any other attitude 
or mental state toward the fact) that we do. Thus, the vicious regress problem32 and 
the over-intellectualization problem are avoided. This way, proponents of the 
epistemic accessibility of justification have a way of conceptualizing the relevant 
kind of accessibility, but without falling prey to common externalist objections. 
Moreover, I do not doubt that there are other plausible ways for the proponent of 
this kind of position to understand the accessibility in question. However, for 
present purposes, when it comes to how the justification facts are accessible, I will 
take the accessibilist to be committed to something like the JJ principle.  
In sum, these are the core commitments that the accessibilist should make. 
First, he should claim that facts about propositional, and not doxastic, justification 
                                                        
30 There are of course other ways of fleshing out the JJ principle, but I think this is a plausible 
first proposal. A similar suggestion is hinted at (but not endorsed) by Nico Silins, "The Evil 
Demon Inside," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming), and developed and 
argued for in great detail by Smithies, The Epistemic Role of Consciousness. 
31 Having discussed the JJ principle with colleagues, I have found that some of them feel that it 
somehow is too weak to capture the kind of accessibility that the internalist is (or should be) 
interested in. In response to this kind of worry, I simply want to point out that there isn't any 
general agreement among internalists about what the relevant kind of access involves. Rather, 
the idea is that reflection on certain kinds of cases (what I'm in this paper calling unfamiliar 
faculty cases) supports the idea that facts about justification are a priori accessible in some sense 
or other, and that the internalist should figure out how to spell out this access condition. That 
being said, the JJ principle seems like a perfectly fine proposal. 
32 It still generates an infinite regress insofar as having first-order justification to hold a certain 
doxastic attitude ultimately requires an infinite regress of higher-order justifications to believe 
that one has the lower-order justifications. However, as Smithies, "Moore's Paradox and the 
Accessibility of Justification," 277, points out, since this is a regress propositional justifications—
in order to have first-order justification for a doxastic attitude it is not required that one actually 
believe any of these higher-order propositions—it is benign. Indeed, having such a stock of 
infinite (higher-order) justifications doesn't seem any more problematic than it is for someone 
who has justification to believe that p to also have justification to believe that pq, justification 
to believe that p  r, and so on. Moreover, neither case of infinite justifications seems to require 
that the agent must be able to form the relevant beliefs. After all, the disjunctive propositions 
just mentioned may be too many or too large for any finite mind with finite computational 
capacity to believe. 
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are accessible. Second, he should claim that the justification facts are accessible just 
in case both one's justifiers and the facts about justificatory support are accessible. 
Third, he should claim that the justification facts are epistemically, and not 
psychologically, accessible. Taken together, this enables us to formulate the 
following plausible position, which avoids many of the traditional problems that 
have plagued the internalist: 
Accessibilism: necessarily, one always has propositional justification to believe the 
justification facts (or, alternatively, what one's justifiers are and how they support 
the doxastic attitudes they do). 
3. The Argument from Unfamiliar Faculties 
According to simple process reliabilism, like that of the early Alvin Goldman,33 the 
justification facts are a function of the reliability of one's doxastic dispositions. 
However, by now, many counterexamples to this analysis are on the table. The 
counterexamples usually either demonstrate that reliability isn't necessary for 
justification or that it isn't sufficient for justification.34 One of the most famous 
counterexamples to the sufficiency claim is provided by BonJour and goes as 
follows:  
Clairvoyance 
Norman, under certain conditions which usually obtain, is a completely reliable 
clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no 
evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a 
cognitive power or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman 
comes to believe that the President is in New York City, though he has no 
evidence either for or against this belief. In fact the belief is true and results from 
his clairvoyant power under circumstances in which it is completely reliable.35 
Now, according to simple process reliabilism, since Norman's belief about the 
President's whereabouts is reliably produced (and there are no undefeated 
defeaters), it is justified. However, intuitively, the reliabilist verdict is clearly 
wrong; Norman's belief doesn't seem any more justified than a random hunch. 
Hence, simple process reliabilism is wrong.  
Consider now another counterexample provided by Lehrer: 
                                                        
33 Alvin Goldman, "What is Justified Belief," In Justification and Knowledge, ed. George Pappas 
(Boston: D. Reidel, 1979), 1-25. 
34 The most famous counterexample to the necessity claim is provided by Keith Lehrer and 
Stewart Cohen, "Justification, Truth, and Coherence," Synthese 55, 2 (1983): 191-207. 
35 BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, 41; Cf. Laurence BonJour, "Externalist 
Theories of Empirical Knowledge", Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5, 1 (1980): 53-73. 
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Truetemp 
Suppose a person, whom we shall call Mr. Truetemp, undergoes brain surgery by 
an experimental surgeon who invents a small device which is both a very accurate 
thermometer and a computational device capable of generating thoughts. The 
device, call it tempucomp, is implanted in Truetemp's head... and acts as a sensor 
to transmit information about the temperature to the computational system in his 
brain... Assume that the tempucomp is very reliable, and so his thoughts are 
correct temperature thoughts... Now imagine, finally, that he... accepts [these 
thoughts] unreflectively, another effect of the tempucomp. Thus, he thinks and 
accepts that the temperature is 104 degrees. It is.36 
Once again, simple process reliabilism tells us that Truetemp's belief about the 
temperature is justified, since it is reliably produced (and there are no undefeated 
defeaters). However, just as with Norman, this seems to be the wrong verdict: 
intuitively, Truetemp's belief is clearly not justified. Hence, simple process 
reliabilism is wrong.  
Moreover, when diagnosing where exactly simple process reliabilism goes 
wrong, BonJour and Lehrer provide the resources necessary for formulating an 
argument, based on the intuitions elicited by the scenarios above, for accessibilism. 
The argument makes use of the fact that the beliefs of the subjects in the scenarios 
above are produced by what we may call an unfamiliar faculty;37 i.e., a faculty for 
belief production which a subject has, but without any awareness of the fact that 
he has it or of why beliefs produced by that faculty should be true. Consider the 
following passage, where BonJour offers his diagnosis:  
One reason why externalism may seem initially plausible is that if the external 
relation in question genuinely obtains [i.e., the reliable relation between one's 
belief and the truth], then Norman will in fact not go wrong in accepting the 
belief, and it is, in a sense, not an accident that this is so: it would not be an 
accident from the standpoint of our hypothetical observer who knows all the 
relevant facts and laws. But how is this supposed to justify Norman's belief? From 
his subjective perspective it is an accident that the belief is true. And the 
suggestion here is that the rationality of justifiability of Norman's belief should be 
judged from Norman's own perspective rather than from one which is unavailable 
to him.38 
                                                        
36 Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge (Routledge, 1990), 163-164. 
37 The term is borrowed from Andrew Moon, "How to Use Cognitive Faculties You Never Knew 
You Had," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99, 1 (2018): 251-275. 
38 BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, 43-44; Cf. Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa, 
Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues (Blackwell 
Publishing, 2003), 32: '[Norman is] being epistemically irrational and irresponsible in accepting 
beliefs whose provenance can only be a total mystery to [him], whose status is as far as [he] can 
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Similarly, Lehrer writes: 
Though he [i.e., Truetemp] records the information because of the operations of 
the tempucomp, he is ignorant of the facts about the tempucomp and about his 
temperature telling reliability. Yet, the sort of causal, nomological, statistical, or 
counterfactual relationships required by externalism may all be present. Does he 
know [or have justification to believe] that the temperature is 104 degrees when 
the thought occurs to him while strolling in Pima Canyon? He has no idea why 
the thought occurred to him or that such thoughts are almost always correct. He 
does not, consequently, know [or have justification to believe] that the 
temperature is 104 degrees when that thought occurs to him.39 
What BonJour and Lehrer here tell us is that simple process reliabilism (and 
other forms of externalism) cannot be correct since it counts reliably produced 
beliefs that are wholly arbitrary or unsupported from the subject's first person 
perspective as justified. However, as the Clairvoyance and Truetemp scenarios 
above indicate, a subject can only have justification for a certain belief if it isn't an 
accident from his perspective why that belief should be true. In other words, 
beliefs produced by unfamiliar faculties cannot be justified since the truth of those 
beliefs would be completely accidental to the subject who has them. Indeed, 
according to the internalist, the most plausible explanation for the intuitions 
elicited by the cases above—namely, that Norman and Truetemp's beliefs are 
unjustified—is that one must always have a special sort of access to the justificatory 
status of one's doxastic attitudes, if they are justified.40 By abductive reasoning, we 
can therefore conclude from these intuitions that accessibilism is true. 
Recently, the argument from unfamiliar faculties for accessibilism has been 
heavily criticized. In the next three sections, I will respond to three different ways 
in which the argument above has been challenged. Doing this, the goal is to 
demonstrate that the argument withstands recent externalist objections, and that 
its conclusion remains as plausible as ever.  
4. The Bullet-Biting Response 
Some externalists have responded to the argument above by arguing that the 
intuitions elicited by cases involving unfamiliar faculties actually support 
externalism. For example, Sven Bernecker claims that the argument from 
                                                                                                                      
tell no different from that of a stray hunch or arbitrary conviction.' 
39 Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge, 164. 
40 Internalists take it to be the best explanation because it is the explanation that is most virtuous. 
For example, it is very simple, and it provides a unified explanation that accounts for both 
BonJour and Lehrer's scenarios, but with the power to generalize to other similar cases as well. 
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unfamiliar faculties somehow is biased against reliabilism by assuming that those 
kinds of faculties aren't really reliable, and that if we properly acknowledge the 
fact that they are (in the relevant scenarios), then we will also realize that the 
beliefs they produce are justified. Focusing on BonJour's clairvoyance case, this is 
how he puts it: 
I think it is questionable whether the clairvoyance example poses a threat to 
externalist reliabilism. The intuitive plausibility of the thought experiment hinges 
on the presumption that clairvoyance is not reliable. Yet if a clairvoyant faculty 
actually existed, then either it would prove itself reliable or not. If it proved itself 
reliable, then intuitively there would be no reason to deny clairvoyants 
justification and knowledge. BonJour's internalist interpretation of the thought 
experiment presupposes a bias against clairvoyance.41 
Here, Bernecker is making the point that (presumably) there aren't any 
reliable clairvoyants in the actual world, and that if there are reliable clairvoyants 
in the possible world that Norman finds himself in and he happens to be one of 
them, then we should have intuitions to the effect that his belief about the 
President's whereabouts is justified.42 Moreover, if I understand Bernecker 
correctly, the reason most of us don't have those intuitions is that we let certain 
facts about our world (that there aren't any reliable clairvoyants or temperature-
tellers) skew our judgments about certain facts (the justificatory status of Norman 
or Truetemp's beliefs) in other possible worlds. 
However, in response, I will make two points against Bernecker. First, 
claiming that if clairvoyance (or the tempucomp) really is reliable, then "there 
would be no reason to deny clairvoyants justification and knowledge" is simply 
wrong. The majority of philosophers appear to be swayed by internalist intuitions 
when it comes to cases involving unfamiliar faculties (at least judging by the 
current state of the literature), and that does provide us with good reason to deny 
that beliefs produced by unfamiliar faculties are justified.43 Moreover, the 
internalist also has a good—indeed, I've argued, the best—explanation for why so 
many who reflect on the clairvoyance and Truetemp scenarios deny that the 
                                                        
41 Sven Bernecker, "Agent Reliabilism and the Problem of Clairvoyance," Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 76, 1 (2008): 166. 
42 Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 119, 
seems to make an analogous point with his Nyrmoon case. 
43 Here I'm not making the claim that most philosophers have internalist opinions, but that they 
have internalist intuitions about unfamiliar faculty cases. When looking at the literature that has 
developed around these kinds of cases, it seems that externalists generally tend to share the 
internalist intuitions, but rather give more weight to other theoretical considerations that speak 
against them. 
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subjects in those cases have justification: namely, one must always have a special 
sort of access to the justificatory status of one's doxastic attitudes, if they are 
justified. 
Second, Bernecker's alternative explanation of internalist intuitions about 
the clairvoyance case—namely, that they are biased or skewed due to the fact that 
the faculty in question (i.e., clairvoyance) doesn't really exist—is problematic. To 
see why that is so, we must ask ourselves whether it is only the intuitions elicited 
by the clairvoyance case that are biased in the way Bernecker suggests? If so, then 
the Truetemp case still supports accessibilism and Bernecker's response fails. If, 
however, it isn't only the intuitions elicited by the clairvoyance case that are 
biased, then he needs to say something about which kinds of cases are likely to give 
rise to biased intuitions. If he thinks this is the case when it comes to all scenarios 
involving unfamiliar faculties (which I suspect he does), then, unless he is able to 
provide some principled motivation for this view, it is clearly ad hoc. After all, 
why should intuitions about reliable clairvoyants or temperature-tellers be less 
trustworthy than intuitions about, say, Gettier-cases, brains-in-vats, demon's 
victims, epistemic akrasia or belief in Moorean conjunctions? A possible response 
hinted at in the passage quoted above is that our intuitions are trustworthy only 
insofar as they are about cases involving phenomena that exist in the actual 
world—which reliable clairvoyants and temperature tellers don't.  
However, there are a couple of problems with this view. First, it is 
committed to denying the commonly accepted position that modal or 
counterfactual intuitions can teach us about things that are merely possible.44 For 
example, it seems that modal intuitions about, say, Sherlock Holmes and his 
extraordinary abilities can teach us that such a man possibly could have existed, 
but, according to the view at hand, they cannot. Second, it is hard to see what kind 
of considerations could motivate the view, especially since Bernecker doesn't 
provide any. It does of course save the reliabilist from having to give 
counterintuitive judgments about various cases, but that is of course a completely 
ad hoc reason for the view when the plausibility of reliabilism itself is in question. 
For these reasons I think that Bernecker's response ultimately fails. 
5. The Alternative Explanations Response 
On balance, most philosophers appear to agree that Norman and Truetemp don't 
have justification for their beliefs. According to accessibilism, the best explanation 
                                                        
44 See, e.g., George Bealer, "Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance,” in 
Conceivability and Possibility, eds. Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne (Oxford University 
Press, 2002); and Colin McGinn, Mindsight (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Pres, 2004). 
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for this intuitive datum is that the justification facts always are epistemically 
accessible. However, this is not the only plausible explanation. Indeed, many 
externalists have offered their own explanations for the intuitive datum that 
Norman and Truetemp don't have justification for their beliefs. For example, 
Bergmann45 and Graham46 claim that the reason they don't have justification is that 
their beliefs aren't produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties; Breyer 
and Greco47 claim that the faculties responsible for their beliefs aren't properly 
integrated with their cognitive character; Lyons48 claims that their beliefs lack the 
appropriate etiology; and Comesaña49 claims that they aren't supported by 
reliabilist evidence. In a recent paper, however, Harmen Ghijsen50 has plausibly 
argued that all of these alternative explanations ultimately fail.51 Moreover, in 
order to remedy their shortcomings, Ghijsen offers his own externalist explanation 
of why neither Norman nor Truetemp has justification for their belief. In this 
section, I will take a closer look at Ghijsen's explanation and argue that it too 
ultimately fails.  
According to Ghijsen,52 we (as cognitively sophisticated agents) have certain 
largely unconscious monitoring mechanisms that detect and respond to the origins 
of the information we receive and its coherence with other information we 
possess. If, for example, these monitoring mechanisms detect information that 
comes from an unreliable source or information that doesn't cohere with certain 
other beliefs or experiences, then they reject it. Drawing on the work of Alvin 
Plantinga53 and Peter Graham,54 Ghijsen claims that, taken together, these 
monitoring mechanisms make up one's defeater system; i.e., a system whose proper 
                                                        
45 Bergmann, Justification without Awareness. 
46 Peter Graham, "Functions, Warrant, History," in Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue, eds. Abrol 
Fairweather and Owen Flanagan (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 15-35; Peter Graham, 
"Against Inferential Reliabilism: Making Origins Matter More," Philosophical Analysis: The 
Journal for the Korean Society for Analytic Philosophy 15 (2014): 87-122. 
47 Benjamin Breyer and John Greco, "Cognitive Integration and the Ownership of Belief: 
Response to Bernecker,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Review 76, 1 (2008): 173-184. 
48 Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs. 
49 Juan Comesaña, "Evidentialist Reliabilism," Nous 44, 4 (2010): 571-600. 
50 Harmen Ghijsen, "Noman and Truetemp Revisited Reliabilistically: a Proper Functionalist 
Account of Clairvoyance," Episteme 13, 1 (2016): 15-34. 
51 Although I don't have the space to go deeper into the issue here, let me just note that I think 
Ghijsen's criticisms are successful. Moreover, I'm not alone in doing so: see, e.g., Moon, "How To 
Use Cognitive Faculties You Never Knew You Had." 
52 Ibid., 102. 
53 Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
54 Graham, "Functions, Warrant, History." 
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function is the reliable prevention of forming or maintaining false beliefs. This is 
why he says that there is a "Proper Functionalist Defeat (PFD)" condition on 
justification, which he formulates as follows: 
PFD S's belief in p at t is justified only if S does not have a defeater system D such 
that, had D been working properly, it would have resulted in S's not believing p at 
t.55 
Moreover, according Ghijsen, PFD plausibly explains why Norman and Truetemp's 
beliefs are unjustified. Since their defeater systems would have rejected their 
beliefs if they had been functioning properly, they cannot be justified:  
[T]he information presented by their special senses is not corroborated by any of 
their other senses, nor does the information stem from a recognizable trustworthy 
source. This should give their monitoring mechanisms sufficient cause to prevent 
the information from rising to the status of belief.56 
Now we have two plausible, but competing, explanations of the 
Clairvoyance and Truetemp scenarios. On the one hand, the accessibilist says that 
the reason Norman and Truetemp's beliefs are unjustified is that they have been 
produced by unfamiliar faculties and, as a result, their truth is completely arbitrary 
or accidental from their subjective point of view. On the other hand, Ghijsen says 
that the reason their beliefs are unjustified is that their defeater systems aren't 
functioning properly, since they would have prevented the formation of those 
beliefs if they had. How are we to decide between these explanations? In light of 
the scenarios presented above in section 3, this is rather difficult since both of 
them respect the intuition that Norman and Truetemp's beliefs are unjustified. In 
order to decide between them, we therefore need another scenario where they 
yield different verdicts. Continuing, I will present a scenario offered by Ghijsen 
himself (in response to Graham) and develop a slightly modified version of it 
where accessibilism and PFD disagree about how it should be interpreted.  
Consider the following variation on BonJour's original clairvoyance case: 
Norbert 
Norbert is the son of a mother and father who both have reliable clairvoyant 
abilities and have been able to reproduce because of the benefit these clairvoyant 
abilities have provided for them. However, there are not (yet) many people who 
have these clairvoyant abilities, and their existence is kept secret. The abilities are 
due to specialized internal organs that pick up on special energy waves in the 
environment, and then output brief visual images which represent that such-and-
                                                        
55 Ghijsen, "Noman and Truetemp Revisited Reliabilistically," 106. 
56 Ibid., 108. 
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so is currently the case at some distant place. Furthermore, the abilities usually 
become active quite suddenly some time after puberty. Norbert's parents have 
decided not to tell him about the existence of his clairvoyant abilities, and 
Norbert has no evidence for or against their existence in general or his own 
having them. Some time after puberty, Norbert suddenly experiences a brief 
visual image of the President being in New York City and on that basis believes 
that the president is in New York City.57 
Ghijsen tells us that, intuitively, Norbert's belief is unjustified despite being 
reliably formed—and with this the accessibilist agrees. The explanations that 
Ghijsen and the accessibilist offer are of course different, but the intuition elicited 
by the example is called into question by neither.58 However, the case can easily be 
modified—or perhaps I should say expanded upon – so that it yields another result. 
Consider the following case, which I call Norbert Jr. 
Norbert Jr. 
Hundreds of years after Norbert developed his clairvoyant abilities, clairvoyance 
has become a widespread phenomenon with the majority of people now 
developing clairvoyant abilities, but without any associated visual imagery, 
shortly after puberty. The reason is that clairvoyants have an enormous 
evolutionary advantage; their chances of surviving and reproducing are far greater 
than those of people without clairvoyant abilities. Moreover, clairvoyance has 
now become such an integrated part of most people's cognitive lives that the 
people who have that ability also have defeater systems whose proper function no 
longer is to prevent the formation or maintenance of clairvoyant beliefs.59 
Norbert Jr. is one of Norbert's descendants. The community in which he lives 
(including his friends and family) has decided not to tell him about the 
                                                        
57 Ibid., 98. 
58 This is somewhat of a simplification. Personally I have conflicting intuitions about the case due 
to the fact that Norbert's clairvoyant faculty is stipulated to output visual images that are 
(presumably) internally accessible. For this reason, the clairvoyant faculty might appear to 
function more or less as a quasi-visuoperceptual faculty, differing mainly insofar as it is able to 
provide the subject with visual representations of things that are happening at a far greater 
distance than regular perception. Thus, Norbert's clairvoyant belief might appear to be justified 
in more or less the same way and to more or less the same degree as regular visual beliefs. For 
this reason, I will stipulate in the scenario below that the subject (Norbert Jr.) doesn't have the 
kind of clairvoyance induced visual experiences that Norbert does. Doing this, the case is 
presented in such a way that Ghijsen and the accessibilist will offer different verdicts, but 
without relying on unnecessary elements (visual imagery) that only serves to complicate the 
scenario and our intuitions about it.  
59 The clairvoyant beliefs might thus perhaps be a bit like spontaneous beliefs about the 
dangerousness of snakes for us. For more on snake-beliefs and proper function, see Moon, "How 
To Use Cognitive Faculties You Never Knew You Had." 
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clairvoyant abilities of his species, and Norbert Jr. has no evidence for or against 
their existence in general or his own having them. Some time after puberty, 
Norbert spontaneously forms the clairvoyant belief that the President is in New 
York City. 
Intuitively, Norbert Jr.'s belief is unjustified. After all, his epistemic position 
appears to be no better than that of Norbert. And according to the accessibilist, 
that is correct. Indeed, accessibilism tells us that the best explanation for why 
Norbert Jr.'s belief is unjustified is that it has been produced by an unfamiliar 
faculty and, as a result, its truth is completely arbitrary or accidental from his first 
person perspective. However, according to Ghijsen this cannot be correct. Since 
Norbert Jr.'s defeater system is functioning properly, his belief about the 
President's whereabouts should be justified. But this just does not seem plausible. 
Of course, Ghijsen can always insist that Norbert Jr.'s belief is unjustified, but that 
the right explanation for why that is so should be sought somewhere else; after all, 
PFD is only a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for justification. However, 
this would be a very problematic move: not only does it undermine the motivation 
for PFD (i.e., its ability to plausibly explain the intuitions elicited by clairvoyance-
style cases), but it also puts Ghijsen in a position where he has to come up with 
another explanation for the Norbert Jr. case—and why not accessibilism? Hence, in 
light of the Norbert Jr. case, Ghijsen's PFD either gives what clearly appears to be 
the wrong verdict, or it loses its motivation.  
6. Bergmann's Dilemma 
The third objection I want to consider is offered by Bergmann. According to 
Bergmann, accessibilism is motivated by its ability to avoid what he calls 'The 
Subject's Perspective Objection (SPO):' 
The Subject's Perspective Objection:60 If the subject holding a belief isn't aware of 
what that belief has going for it, then she isn't aware of how its status is any 
different from a stray hunch or an arbitrary conviction. From that we may 
conclude that from her perspective it is an accident that her belief is true. And 
that implies that it isn't a justified belief.61 
                                                        
60 The SPO encapsulates why beliefs produced by unfamiliar faculties intuitively cannot be 
justified; the reason is that their truth is completely accidental or unsupported from one's 
subjective perspective. 
61 Bergmann, Justification without Awareness, 12. 
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However, as he sees it, accessibilism faces a dilemma, thus making it unfit to 
explain the intuitions elicited by unfamiliar faculty cases. The dilemma he presents 
is as follows:62 
A Dilemma for Internalism 
1) An essential feature of internalism is that it makes a subject's actual or 
potential awareness of some justification-contributor a necessary condition for 
the justification of any belief held by that subject. 
2) The awareness required by internalism is either strong or weak awareness. 
3) If the awareness required by internalism is strong awareness, then internalism 
has vicious regress problems leading to radical skepticism. 
4) If the awareness required by internalism is weak awareness, then internalism 
is vulnerable to the SPO, in which case internalism loses its main motivation 
for imposing the awareness requirement. 
5) If internalism either leads to radical skepticism or loses its main motivation 
for imposing the awareness requirement (i.e., avoiding the SPO), then we 
should not endorse internalism. 
6) Therefore, we should not endorse internalism.63 
In order to get a better grip on how the dilemma actually goes, we need to 
say a little bit about what Bergmann means by "weak" and "strong" accessibility/ 
awareness. Strong awareness, more specifically, involves "conceiving of  the 
justifier that is the object of awareness as being in some way relevant to the 
justification or truth of the belief" it supports;64 i.e., it requires that one somehow 
conceptualizes the justifier as supporting the belief in question. Weak awareness, 
on the other hand, doesn't require this sort of conceptualization. So Bergmann's 
dilemma tells us that proponents of accessibilism either support weak or strong 
accessibilism. If they support strong accessibilism, then they face vicious regress 
problems that lead to radical skepticism. But if they support weak accessibilism, 
then they become vulnerable to the SPO. In either case, accessibilism fails.  
In the literature, both premise 3 and premise 4 have been challenged. For 
example, Thomas Crisp65 and Rogers and Matheson66 argue that premise 3 is false 
                                                        
62 An early and somewhat underdeveloped version of the dilemma was first presented by 
Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Skepticism, 63-65. 
63 Bergmann, Justification without Awareness, 13-14. 
64 Ibid., 13. 
65 Thomas Crisp, "A Dilemma for Internalism," Synthese 174 (2009): 355-366. 
66 Jason Rogers and Jonathan Matheson, "Bergmann's Dilemma: Exit Strategies for Internalists," 
Philosophical Studies 152 (2011): 60-61.  
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by presenting a version of strong accessibilism that doesn't face vicious regress 
problems. However, since I have some reservations about their argument, I will 
focus on premise 4 instead. 
When it comes to premise 4, Bergmann tells us that weak 
accessibility/awareness of a justifier isn't sufficient to make the truth of the 
doxastic attitude it supports non-accidental from the subject's perspective and 
therefore not sufficient to justify said attitude (i.e., it is vulnerable to the SPO). 
This is the case, according to Bergmann, for both conceptual and nonconceptual 
versions of weak accessibilism. According to nonconceptual versions of weak 
accessibilism, there is a weak accessibility condition on justification that doesn't 
require the subject to conceive of the justifier in any way. However, as Bergmann 
sees it, such conceptualization is necessary in order to avoid the SPO: 
[S]ince the awareness required is nonconceptual, a person can have the required 
awareness of [the justifier] without conceiving of [it] in any way—without 
categorizing it according to any classificatory scheme. But then [a subject] can be 
nonconceptually aware of [the justifier] without conceiving of [it] as relevant at 
all to the appropriateness of his belief. According to the SPO, if [the subject] does 
not conceive of [the justifier] as something relevant to the appropriateness of his 
belief, it is an accident from [his] perspective that his belief is true. Clearly this 
supposed problem is not solved by requiring [the subject] to be nonconceptually 
aware of [the justifier].67 
Similarly, according to Bergmann, conceptual versions of weak accessibilism 
also face the SPO. According to conceptual versions of weak accessibilism, there is 
a weak accessibility condition on justification that does require the subject to 
conceive of the justifier, but not in any way that makes it relevant to the 
appropriateness of the belief (or other doxastic attitude) it supports. However, once 
again, conceiving of the justifier as supporting the belief it in fact does support is 
necessary in order to avoid the SPO:  
Would it help if we added instead the requirement that [a subject] has a 
conceptual weak awareness of [the justifier]? Here again the answer is 'no'. For 
[the subject] could satisfy this sort of requirement simply by being aware of [the 
justifier] and applying some concept or other to it. . . And that means that [the 
subject] can have a conceptual weak awareness of [the justifier] without 
conceiving of [it] as relevant in any way to the appropriateness of his belief B. But 
then, according to the SPO, even if this added requirement were satisfied, it 
would still be an accident from [the subject's] perspective that B is true. For 
although [the subject] applies a concept to [the justifier], he doesn't apply the 
right sort of concept to it. He doesn't apply a concept that involves his conceiving 
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of [the justifier] as contributing in some way to B's justification (or as indicating 
that B is likely to be true or some such thing). The only way to guarantee that he 
does apply such a concept to [the justifier] is to have B satisfy a strong awareness 
requirement. Thus, we are forced to concede that by imposing only a conceptual 
weak awareness requirement, the internalist is vulnerable to the SPO.68 
Thus, the upshot for Bergmann is that weak accessibilism—whether it is of a 
conceptual or non-conceptual version—becomes unmotivated since it is vulnerable 
to the SPO.  
In response, Rogers and Matheson69 have argued that versions of weak 
accessibilism that appeal to "seemings" as justifiers—including Michael Huemer's 
phenomenal conservatism70—provide counterexamples to premise 4. As they see it, 
seemings, defined as inclinations to form certain beliefs,71 can satisfy the weak 
accessibility/ awareness condition:  
[T]he seeming may result for the subject as a result of merely weak awareness of 
some object of first-order awareness. This being the case, an individual can be in a 
state wherein he hosts the seeming that some proposition is true while remaining 
in a state of weak—or even nonconceptual—awareness of that seeming, or while 
having no higher-order awareness of the seeming at all, and all while remaining 
in a state of weak awareness concerning the object of first-order awareness that 
gives rise to that seeming.72 
Moreover, not only can such justifying seemings satisfy weak awareness, they also 
escape the SPO. Absent any relevant defeaters, if it seems to one that p, then p's 
truth isn't accidental from one's subjective perspective. This appears to be correct. 
If a certain proposition—for example that I'm currently reading a philosophy 
paper, or that Reykjavik is the capital of Iceland—seems true, then the truth of 
that proposition isn't accidental or surprising from one's first-person perspective. 
Referring back to BonJour's Clairvoyance scenario, Rogers and Matheson put the 
point as follows:  
                                                        
68 Ibid., 20-21. 
69 Rogers & Matheson, "Bergmann's Dilemma." 
70 See Michael Huemer, Skepticism and the Veil of Ignorance (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2001); Michael Huemer, "Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism," Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 74 (2007): 30-55. 
71 Cf. Richard Swinburne, Epistemic Justification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 141-
142; and Earl Conee, "First Things First," in Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology, eds. Earl 
Conee and Richard Feldman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 15, who also claim that 
seemings are inclinations to believe. However, not everyone agrees. Huemer, "Compassionate 
Phenomenal Conservatism," for example, argues rather plausibly that seemings and inclinations 
to believe are conceptually distinct and therefore can come apart. 
72 Rogers & Matheson, "Bergmann's Dilemma," 60-61. 
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There is a clear subjective difference, for example, between the belief that 
inexplicably (from his own perspective) pops into Norman the clairvoyant's head 
as a result of the operation of his clairvoyant powers, on the one hand, and a 
subject's belief in some proposition as a result of the proposition's actually 
seeming true to him upon his understandingly considering it and being weakly 
aware of some object of awareness (e.g., conceptual inclusion relationships), on 
the other. After all, in the latter case, the proposition seems true to the subject—
to use the language of Plantinga, the subject feels 'pushed' or 'impelled' toward 
believing it.73 
Moreover, even though I think the authors mentioned above are correct 
insofar as versions of weak accessibilism that appeal to seemings as justifiers do 
provide genuine counterexamples to Bergmann's fourth premise,74 I want to argue 
that the version of accessibilism that has been the focus of this paper—something 
                                                        
73 Ibid., 61. 
74 Michael Bergmann, "Phenomenal Conservatism and the Dilemma for Internalism," in 
Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, ed. Chris 
Tucker (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 170-171, objects by presenting a couple of 
scenarios with the purpose of making it intuitive that it is possible to have a conscious seeming 
that p (that satisfies the weak accessibility condition), but that it is an accident from one's 
perspective that p is true. The scenarios he presents have the same structure: there is an 
epistemic agent who has the relevant kind of seeming and who holds the corresponding belief, 
but who is incapable (due to severe cognitive failings or malfunctions) to conceive of the seeming 
as relevant to the truth of the corresponding belief. Instead, the agent simply holds the belief for 
silly or irrational motives, and not because of the seeming itself. As a result, according to 
Bergmann, it is intuitive that the truth of the agent's belief is completely accidental from his first 
person perspective; in which case Rogers and Matheson's proposal falls prey to the SPO.  
However, Luca Moretti and Tommaso Piazza, "Phenomenal Conservatism and Bergmann's 
Dilemma," Erkenntnis 80 (2015): 1271-1290, have plausibly responded by arguing that 
Bergmann's scenarios fail to show that beliefs properly based on, or justified by, seemings fall 
prey to the SPO, since the agents in the scenarios hold the relevant beliefs in an irrational 
manner that isn't properly based on the seemings. This is how they put it: "It [i.e., Bergmann's 
example] only teaches us that if a subject S is just weakly aware of a seeming that P, believes that 
P but bases her belief that P on neither her seeming that P nor on any other source of epistemic 
justification, then it is an accident from S's perspective that her belief that P is true (if the belief 
is true at all). Thus Bergmann's example gives us no reason for claiming that S's weak awareness 
of her seeming that P cannot prevent S's belief that P from being accidentally true from S's own 
perspective when S's belief that P is based on her seeming that P." (Ibid., 1279.) 
Moreover, another problem with Bergmann's scenarios is that since the agents suffer from severe 
cognitive failings or malfunctions that make them unable to conceive of the seemings as relevant 
to the truth of the beliefs they hold, they might not actually have any genuine seemings after all. 
If it "seems" to one that p, but one doesn't have the cognitive capacity to recognize it as in any 
way relevant to the truth the belief that p, then the "seeming" might not be a proper seeming 
after all.  
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akin to the JJ principle of section 2.3—also provides a counterexample to it. 
Consider again the JJ principle. It says that one has justification to believe (or, 
alternatively, withhold/disbelieve) that p, only if one has higher-order justification 
to believe that one has justification to believe (or, alternatively, 
withhold/disbelieve) that p. By way of example, the principle says that if you have 
justification to believe, say, that Reykjavik is the capital of Iceland, then you have 
(higher-order) justification to believe that you have justification to believe that 
Reykjavik is the capital of Iceland. Now, there are two things to notice here. First, 
the JJ principle satisfies the weak awareness condition. It tells us that the 
justification facts are accessible in the sense that they are accompanied by higher-
order justifications that enable the subject to believe with doxastic justification 
what those facts are, if he can take advantage of his epistemic position.75 So, in 
other words, the subject need not be psychologically capable of believing the 
justification facts or even to have conceptualized the justifier as in any way 
relevant to the belief in question. 
Second, the JJ principle isn't vulnerable to the SPO. If one has higher-order 
justification to believe that one has justification to believe that p whenever one 
does have justification to believe that p, then p isn't accidental or unsupportedfrom 
one's first person perspective; after all, by taking advantage of one's epistemic 
position and believing in accordance with one's higher-order justification, the 
subject will know what the justification facts are. Sure, the subject may not 
consciously recognize what the belief in question has going for it, but it doesn't 
follow from this that its truth would be accidental from his perspective. Consider 
the proposition about the capital of Iceland above. Let's say that you have 
justification to believe that Reykjavik is the capital of Iceland and higher-order 
introspective and reflective justification to believe that you do. Let's also stipulate 
that you aren't consciously aware of your justification for belief in the proposition 
about the capital of Iceland above. It may, for example, be that your justifier is a 
memory belief to the effect that a trustworthy person told you that Reykjavik is 
the capital of Iceland and that you're either unable to recall that memory at this 
                                                        
75 Another way of cashing out this point is by using Declan Smithies', "Why Justification 
Matters," in  Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology, eds. David Henderson and John 
Greco (Oxford University Press, 2015), 224-244, notion of an ideally rational counterpart. An 
ideally rational counterpart is someone who is identical to you in every relevant way (e.g., you 
have the same (relevant) justifiers/reasons/evidence), but who always takes advantage of their 
epistemic position by believing what they have justification to believe—at least as long as they 
hold any doxastic attitude about the matter. We can then say that the justification facts are 
accessible in the sense that your ideally rational counterpart always believes them with doxastic 
justification (as long as they hold any attitude toward them). 
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particular moment or that you haven't even bothered trying. Still, it doesn't seem 
that the truth of the proposition that Reykjavik is the capital of Iceland is 
accidental from your subjective perspective. After all, you have introspective 
justification to believe that you have the aforementioned memory belief, and you 
have reflective justification to believe that it supports the proposition that 
Reykjavik is the capital of Iceland. And since you're already in possession of 
justifiers that enable to you consciously recognize and know that you have 
justification to believe that Reykjavik is the capital of Iceland, provided that you 
can exercise your introspective and reflective faculties in a sufficiently virtuous 
manner, there is indeed something that strongly speaks in favor of holding that 
belief from your subjective perspective. Hence, the JJ principle avoids the second 
of horn of Bergmann's dilemma and can figure as a plausible explanation of our 
intuitions about unfamiliar faculty cases. 
7. Conclusion 
According to accessibilism, justification is in some special sense accessible to the 
subject who has it. Accessibilism is mainly motivated by intuitions elicited by 
unfamiliar faculty cases. Recently, however, the view has come under heavy fire 
from a variety of positions. In light of this, the purpose of this paper has been 
twofold. First, I have clarified what commitments the accessibilist should make. 
Doing this, I have shown why the most prominent versions of accessibilism are 
vulnerable to objections that the version endorsed in this paper avoids. Second, I 
have defended the main argument (from unfamiliar faculty cases) for accessibilism 
against three prominent objections levelled against it. The upshot of my discussion 
is that accessibilism, as understood in this paper, remains the best explanation for 
our intuitive judgments about unfamiliar faculty cases: one must always have a 
special sort of access to the justificatory status of one's doxastic attitudes, if they are 
justified.
